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DELIVERY OF DEEDS
By Albert J. Gould, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HERE is no presumption of the delivery of a deed
.jT where it is not recorded until long after its date ** "
The foregoing words were taken verbatim from page
442 of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado, written
by Mr. Justice Campbell, in the case of Larison vs. Taylor,
decided March 19, 1928, and reported in 83 Colorado Reports
at page 430.
The result of this decision is far reaching. If the statu-
tory presumption of the delivery of a deed which is created
by its acknowledgment before a proper officer and by record-
ing it is to be destroyed by the lapse of considerable time be-
tween the date of its execution and the date of recording, we
must discontinue the common practice of placing deeds of
conveyance in escrow pending payment by the purchaser of
the balance of the purchase price under a written contract for
the purchase of real property if the final payment is not to be
made until a "long time" after the execution of the deed, un-
less we provide some means of making record proof of final
delivery.
In the above mentioned case a widow sued her married
daughter to have canceled and discharged of record a war-
ranty deed to said daughter as grantee, which deed the widow
had executed on April 11, 1919, but, as she claimed, had never
been delivered. The defendant (the grantee) recorded the
deed on June 1, 1925, or slightly more than six years subse-
quent to its execution. The Supreme Court held that where
the delivery of a deed is placed in issue, the burden of proving
the delivery is upon the party claiming under the deed, and
that "there is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where
it is not recorded until long after its date".
For all practical purposes, title examiners and others in-
terested in real property titles must henceforth require record
proof of the delivery of deeds appearing in the chain of title
where a "long time" has elapsed between the date of execu-
tion and the date of recording. Until the Supreme Court or
the legislature has defined what is not a "long time" as a mat-
ter of law, or where the line lies between a "long time and a
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short or reasonable time, title examiners and persons affected
by this rule will be forced to make their own estimate as to
what is a reasonable time within which to record such an in-
strument and thereby preserve the presumption of delivery
of the same arising out of its proper acknowledgment and its
being placed of record. A longer time may be allowed to
record an instrument executed in California affecting lands
in Denver than would be allowed to record an instrument
executed in Denver affecting lands in Denver. The principles
responsible for the statutes affecting the presentation of checks
to banking houses as provided in the Negotiable Instruments
Law may be considered in deciding this question.
Many lawyers have been accustomed, when representing
a purchaser of real estate under an installment payment con-
tract, to require that the seller place in escrow a warranty
deed in favor of the purchaser of the premises, the same to be
delivered to him upon payment of the final installment of the
purchase price. Very often such contracts run over a period
of many years, and yet, in view of this decision, it is doubtful
if such a purchaser's title is marketable if he has recorded a
warranty deed a long time subsequent to its execution with
nothing of record to establish the reason for the delay and the
regular delivery of the deed. A marketable title being one
which is established by the records alone without additional
proof and aided only by proper presumptions of law, no title
is marketable which is based upon a deed as to which there
is no presumption of delivery in view of this case and the de-
cisions therein mentioned.
How may we draw escrow agreements involving deeds
to be delivered a long time subsequent to the execution thereof
so that the delivery will be properly established of record?
The following method is suggested. The escrow agreement
should provide that in the event of the delivery of the deed
to the grantee, the escrow holder should make an affidavit to
the effect that he had delivered the deed to the grantee in
accordance with the terms of the escrow agreement and fol-
lowing full performance of the terms of the contract of sale.
The escrow agreement should further provide that the execu-
tion and recording of said affidavit should constitute con-
clusive evidence of the delivery of the deed to the grantee in
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accordance with the terms of the escrow agreement. The con-
tract of sale, of course, should set out the terms of the escrow
and the escrow agreement itself might be embodied in the con-
tract of sale. An affidavit is not conclusive evidence unless
made such by an agreement between the parties whose in-
terests are involved. To record the affidavit of an escrow
holder in the absence of such an agreement making said affi-
davit conclusive evidence would be an empty gesture. With-
out an agreement making the affidavit of the escrow holder
conclusive evidence it seems that a new deed or a new ac-
knowledgment attached to the old deed must be obtained. If
a new deed cannot be obtained from the grantor because of his
refusal to execute the same or on account of his death, a quiet
title decree should be required.
To recapitulate: The 1927 Statute makes the acknowl-
edgment and recording of a deed prima facie evidence of de-
livery. In the above mentioned case the Supreme Court has
held that this presumption fails where a long time expires
between the date of execution and the date of recording the
deed, and that the burden of proving delivery is upon the one
claiming under the deed where delivery is placed in issue.
If the burden of proving delivery is upon the one claiming
under the deed and he is not aided by any presumption of law,
then oral or written evidence of delivery must be produced
by him and the title is not marketable until proper record
proof of delivery is made. It is difficult to determine whether
any curative statutes change the above rule where many years
have elapsed since the date of recording the deed, but space
does-not permit me to discuss those principles in this article.
The case of Phelps vs. Phelps, 71 Colorado, at page 343,
illustrates the possible practical application of the doctrine
of Larison vs. Taylor. In the Phelps case, the father executed
a warranty deed in favor of his children for a ranch property
upon Which he resided, and delivered it to his attorney ab-
solutely and unconditionally with complete instructions to
deliver the same to his children upon his death. He then
continued to exercise control and dominion over the ranch
until he died some months later. Upon his death the attorney
delivered the deed to the children, whereupon the grantor's
widow brought this quiet title suit to establish her statutory
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right to one-half of said premises upon the theory that the
delivery was not complete until the deed was handed by the
attorney to the children after the death of the grantor, because
the grantor continued to exercise dominion and control over
the premises in question after the execution of the deed and
until his death, and because there was no acceptance of the
deed by the grantees and consequently no delivery during the
life time of the grantor. The lower Court and the Supreme
Court of Colorado agreed with this view and the widow was
allowed her statutory one-half. In this connection the follow-
ing portion of the opinion is interesting:
"It is urged, however, that inasmuch as the conveyance was beneficial to
the grantees, their acceptance will be presumed, and with such acceptance the
title vested in them. But that presumption obtains only where the facts are
known. Where the facts and 'the attendant circumstances are shown, the
question must be determined from them; there is no room for presumption.'
Knox vs. Clark, 15 Colo. App. 356, 62 Pac. 334.
"In the case cited the question was further discussed, and the court
pointed out that if 'between the date of a deed and its acceptance, rights of
third parties attached to the property, those rights will be superior to and
prevail over the title of the subsequently assenting grantee'.
Further discussing what constitutes an acceptance by the
grantee, the court said:
" 'The difficulty arises where one party undertakes to make a conveyance
to another without the latter's knowledge, and without any previous under-
standing that the act should be done. The filing of the deed bythe grantor
for record, does not, of itself, constitute a delivery. If the recorder is the
agent of the grantee to receive the deed, then, of course, his acceptance would
be the act of his principal. But where the latter has no knowledge that such
an instrument was contemplated, or that it was made, he can have no agent
to receive it; and until, after acquiring knowledge of its existence, he in some
way signifies his approval of the act, there is no delivery of the deed.'
"The rights of the widow attached under the statute at the instant of her
husband's death, and the acceptance of the deed thereafter by the grantees
named in it was subject to the rights of defendant in error."
If a title examiner had examined this title a few days or
a few weeks following the date this deed was recorded and if
a long time had elapsed between the date of execution of the
deed and the date of recording, he would have refused to pass
the title until proper record proof was made of delivery, and
an investigation would have disclosed the facts and protected
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the person for whom he was examining. On the other hand,
if he had not raised this question, the widow would not have
been estopped to assert her claim even as against a so-called
innocent purchaser for value if she had proceeded with due
diligence, because she could have maintained that the long
period of time between the date of the execution of the in-
strument and the date of recording gave notice of non-delivery
so that the purchaser was not an innocent purchaser for value.
"A knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon
inquiry is constructive notice of all facts which might have
been ascertained by such inquiry or investigation." Tibbetts
vs. Terrill, 44 Colo. 104.
It would be interesting to know how many deeds are now
reposing in the hands of private or corporate escrow holders
awaiting delivery upon the death of some individual or upon
the payment of the last installment of the purchase price which
will not be made until a "long time" after the date of the
execution of the instrument. It would be interesting to know
how many deeds are reposing in the private vaults of husbands
and wives or other persons, which deeds the parties intend to
record prior to or following the death of the grantor and in
any event a "long time" after the execution of the instrument.
The title examiner, however, must report the title to property
affected by such deeds to be unmarketable, unless record proof
of delivery appears.
